

Populism, Participation and Political Equality

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Abstract

This article analyses the ways in which populist attitudes are related to political engagement and political equality. We argue that populist attitudes can be a motivation for political engagement and participation through their emotional and moral components, and that this motivation could eventually narrow gender, age, education, and income gaps in participation. Using survey data from nine European countries, we show that populist attitudes are positively related to political engagement with several relevant differences across modes and countries. Populist attitudes seem to promote in particular internal efficacy and expressive modes of participation such as petition signing and online participation. More importantly, populist attitudes increase involvement and participation specially among the young and the poor, facilitating more equal participation particularly in terms of income. However, populist attitudes do not narrow gender gaps in engagement, and their effect on education-based gaps is also limited. The implications and limitations of these findings are discussed.

Keywords: populism, political attitudes, political participation, electoral turnout, political inequality, participation gaps, gender gaps

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INTRODUCTION

The populist *zeitgeist* (Mudde 2004) that is spreading across the world has brought attention not only to populist parties and their voters but also to populist attitudes among the general public. Several studies have provided conceptual and measurement tools to assess the extent to which people hold populist attitudes (see, for instance, Akkerman et al. 2014; Castanho Silva et al. 2016; Schulz et al 2017; Rooduijn 2014), finding that, indeed, these attitudes are spread well across the population. Others have analysed their correlates (see, for instance, Elchardus & Spruyt 2014; Hawkins & Riding 2010; Rico & Anduiza 2016; Spruyt et al. 2016), suggesting that factors such as age, education, income, ideology, relative deprivation, and sociotropic considerations are related to populist attitudes. However, the behavioural consequences of these populist attitudes have scarcely been explored and then mostly limited to voting choices (Akkerman et al. 2014; Hawkins et al. 2016; van Hauwaert & van Kessel 2017; Stanley 2011).

This article contributes to the knowledge of the implications of populist attitudes among the public by analysing the relationship between them and political engagement. We argue that populist attitudes may constitute a powerful motivation for citizens to engage in politics. By focusing on the primacy of popular sovereignty and by morally condemning the ruling elite, populism may enhance feelings of identity, efficacy, and moral outrage that have been found to be related to participation (van Zomeren et al. 2008). We also argue that these motivations are more likely to have an effect on the less privileged, mobilising particularly disadvantaged citizens that are usually more likely to lack motivations to participate. Hence, populist attitudes are expected to be positively related not only to political participation but also to higher levels of political equality.

Based on survey data from nine European countries, our results suggest that, while populist attitudes are unrelated to electoral turnout, they are positively related to internal efficacy and to expressive modes of participation such as petition signing and online participation. Populist attitudes importantly increase the involvement and participation of the young and the poor. However, populist attitudes do not narrow gender gaps in engagement, and their effect on education-based gaps is also limited.

The paper is structured as follows. In the next section, we outline our arguments linking populist attitudes and political engagement, participation, and equality. We then describe the data and the methods used. The fourth section presents the results of the empirical analysis. Finally, the last section concludes with the discussion of our main findings.

ARGUMENTS AND PREVIOUS WORKS

Populist attitudes as a motivation to engage

We follow the minimal definition summarized by Mudde (Mudde 2004), who argued that populism “considers society to be separated into two relatively homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté générale* (general will) of the people” (543). Two aspects of this definition stand out as particularly relevant for their potential mobilising consequences. Populist attitudes involve a combination of a negative component (rejection of the establishment) and a positive component (a defence of popular sovereignty). Both may be expected to promote political engagement and participation for different reasons. We examine them in turn.

The anti-elitist component involves the sentiment that the political elite is corrupt and evil, and that it acts in accordance with its own benefits and contradicts the interests of the people (Mudde 2004). The literature on participation has emphasised the importance of different negative attitudes such as distrust (see, for instance, Almond & Verba 1963; Hooghe & Marien 2012) or disaffection (Miller 1980; Torcal & Montero 2006). These negative attitudes towards political objects have usually been found to produce apathy and reduce participation, particularly in their institutionalised forms. The anti-elitist component of populism, however, is expected to motivate higher political engagement because it is intimately linked to perceptions of moral outrage.

The anti-establishment dimension of populism has a moralised character: the elite is not only incapable, untrustworthy, and distant but also evil. Moralised attitudes have been found to also enhance motivation to participate (Skitka & Bauman 2008) and to reduce inhibitions against acting (Effron & Miller 2012). In a context where politics is diminished and discredited to the point of being hated (Hay 2007), populist accounts of the political situation produce a necessary legitimized justification for becoming engaged. Perceptions of injustice and subsequent moral outrage have been found to be related to political engagement and, particularly, to protest (Van Stekelenburg & Klandermans 2010; Goodwin et al. 2009; van Zomeren et al. 2008).

This populist critical view of the political elite is connected to emotional states of arousal and anger. While other negative emotions have been associated with populist attitudes (Demertzis 2006), the emotional underpinnings of populist attitudes seem to be in feelings of anger (Rico, Guinjoan & Anduiza 2017). Anger is the typical affect that emerges from a situation where personal damage or the threat of damage is perceived as deriving from negligent behaviour on the part of an external agent in control. Anger has previously been found to enhance political participation to a greater extent than other emotions (see, for instance, Valentino, Brader, Groenendyk, Gregorowicz, & Hutchings 2011; Weber 2012). It contributes to achieving insight and motivating action (Thomson 2006). As far as populist attitudes are related to emotions of anger, they should predispose citizens to engage in active political behaviour.

The popular sovereignty component of populist attitudes can also be expected to promote political engagement. This aspect, which relates naturally to the idea that the people should be at the centre of politics and political decisions, gives populism a determined democratic character, with the will of the people at the core of its values (Mudde & Rovira Kaltwasser 2012). While there are, of course, differences in the extent to which populism may emphasise participation as a means to achieve popular sovereignty, in general, populist movements are likely to promote different types of participation mechanisms. Earlier versions of populist movements developed controlled

labour organisations as a means to channel ordinary citizen participation (Germani 1978). Newer versions have to cope with citizens who have long been enfranchised and thus need to devise new forms of participation at the local level (Rhodes-Purdy 2015) or via digital media (Fenoll & València 2016; Hatakka 2016). This emphasis on popular sovereignty does not necessarily reduce the importance of leadership or the goal to achieve “controlled participation” that preserves hegemony and control over the base. However, it may be expected to produce several consequences in regard to the extent to which people consider the expression of their voices and preferences through participation something relevant and useful. As Aslanidis (2016) puts it, populism can be understood as a collective action frame to construct a collective identity (the people) that challenges the elites. At the individual level, we expect to find some evidence of this identity construction by seeing higher levels of engagement among people who hold strong populist attitudes.

The study of populism has been linked to social protest in the literature of extreme right parties and their repertoires of action (Charnock 2001), as well as in the analysis of the socio-political context of protest (Diani 1996; Flesher Fominaya 2017). In addition, populist movements have been found to display an intense online activity and base their support on this digital realm rather than on formal membership (Bartlett et al. 2012; Engesser et al. 2016; Hatakka 2016; Krämer 2017).

However, the association between populist individual attitudes and political participation has not yet been examined. At the individual level, several works have addressed the effect of political attitudes proximate to populism (such as discontent or support for stealth democracy) on attitudes regarding participation such as willingness to participate or preferences for participation (Webb 2013; Font et al. 2015), which, of course, are different from actual participation. Other works have elaborated on the relationship between cynical understanding of politics and populist angst (Stoker & Hay 2016), but their analyses do not specifically assess the effects of any of these attitudes on participation. Further works focus on actual behaviour as the outcome of interest (mostly turnout but also protest), but explanatory factors are anti-party attitudes (Belanger 2004) or distrust (Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels 2011; Hooghe & Marien 2012; Katsanidou & Eder 2015) rather than populist attitudes. Among these, results seem to point to the conclusion that trust in representative institutions is a favourable attitude for electoral or conventional participation, while distrust increases protest and grass-roots participation. Christensen has analysed the effect of different types of dissatisfaction on protest. The type of dissatisfaction that would come closer to the notion of populist attitudes (a combination of low support and high subjective empowerment) has a small positive effect on protest robust to a large number of controls (Christensen 2014).

A handful of works have explicitly addressed the relationship between populist attitudes and electoral participation based on single-case studies and with mixed conclusions. Akkerman et al. (2014) in the Netherlands and Stanley (2011) in Slovakia find no significant effects. These null findings could be explained by the fact that the focus is on electoral participation, and if the anti-elitist component prevails, anti-party sentiments, discontent, and distrust could induce abstention, particularly if no alternatives to the establishment are perceived as feasible (Belanger 2004; Hooghe, Marien, & Pauwels 2011). Despite this evidence, using comparative data from Latin America and Europe, Allred, Hawkins, and Ruth (2015) have recently shown that right-

wing populist parties increase turnout, while left-wing populist parties do not increase turnout significantly more than other leftist parties.

Our analysis intends to examine this relationship between populist individual attitudes, on the one hand, and political engagement broadly understood, including both an attitudinal (interest, efficacy) and a behavioural dimension (different modes of participation), on the other hand. In accordance with the arguments previously outlined, we expect that *populist attitudes are positively related to political engagement (H1)*.

Populist attitudes as moderators of political inequality

The normative ideal of democracy is one in which every citizen participates; if not, it is at least one in which those who participate are not too different from those who do not. However, the reality is far from this normative ideal. A large part of the literature on political participation has focused on the presence of socioeconomic biases. Socioeconomic characteristics such as age, gender, education, or income have been found to influence participation (Teorell et al. 2007; Brady et al. 1995; Gallego 2008). As a consequence, participants may turn out to be different to from non-participants, with the implications that this projection of socioeconomic inequalities over the political realm may bring. We consider these socioeconomic biases in political participation as indicators of political inequality.

Participation has been found to depend on individual characteristics, to the point that Lijphart identifies this as “democracy’s unresolved dilemma” (1997). Men are slightly but consistently more likely to be engaged, knowledgeable, and efficacious (Burns 2007; Coffé & Bolzendahl 2010; Fraile 2014; Hooghe & Stolle 2008). Younger citizens tend to have lower levels of engagement (Albacete 2014), particularly for voting (Wattenberg 2015) although not always for other modes such as protest or online participation. Educated people are more likely to participate (Verba et al. 1995; Gallego 2010; Teorell et al. 2007), and so are people with higher levels of income (Rosenstone & Hansen 1993; Wolfinger & Rosenstone 1980). While these four variables do not exhaust the list of potential sociodemographic biases of political participation, they cannot be ignored and constitute crucial conditioning factors of political engagement. Whether gender gaps are due to biographical availability or socialization; whether age gaps are the result of life cycle or generational change; whether differences in participation between highly educated people and those with only a basic education are due to the resources or to motivations that come with education, the fact is that these gaps exist to a larger or smaller degree, depending on mode of participation and contexts, in all democracies.

Following this angle, the literature on participation has frequently inquired which factors may moderate these biases induced by socioeconomic characteristics (Verba et al. 1978; Anduiza 2002; Gallego 2015; Rodon & Guinjoan 2017). Our second argument is that populist attitudes can modulate how socioeconomic characteristics affect political engagement by offering a motivation to become engaged that may resonate particularly with those individuals in less-advantaged positions. Mudde and Rovira-Kaltwasser (2012) note that populism can mobilize excluded sections of society and give voice to groups that do not feel represented by the elites. In accordance, we expect that populist attitudes will provide a motivation for becoming engaged that will be more important

for individuals at non-central social situations: women, youth, and less-educated and low-income citizens. Regardless of whether individuals with such profiles are more likely to show populist attitudes, the point to be stressed is that the estimated effect of having such populist attitudes (versus not having them) over engagement is expected to be larger for these disadvantaged groups. These attitudes may be either pre-existing predispositions or the result of being exposed to populist messages (Hameleers & Schmuck 2017), or even the result of economic circumstances themselves (Rico and Anduiza 2017). In any case, what is of interest for our purposes is that we expect them to become motivations for engagement that are particularly effective for those individuals who, due to their socioeconomic characteristics, may be more likely to identify as “the people” or to develop anger and resentment against the established elite.

Previous work by Immerzeel & Pickup (2015) has addressed this question in an indirect way by looking at the extent to which the presence of successful, populist, radical-right parties affect electoral turnout. These authors find that, in Western Europe, the presence of these parties increases the likelihood of voting by those individuals with higher levels of education and interest, a finding that could be capturing both a mobilisation effect of these parties and a reaction against them.

Our argument, however, does not refer to the mobilising potential of populist radical right parties (which is, of course, conditioned by citizens’ ideological orientations and many other contextual elements), but rather to the question of whether having populist attitudes (without the right-wing ideological component that may or may not be associated with specific instances of populism) may work as a motivation particularly relevant for individuals who, because of their socioeconomic characteristics, are more likely to be politically excluded.

Hence, generally, we expect that *populist attitudes reduce the effect of gender, age, education, and income on political engagement by mobilising especially women, young citizens, less educated, and impoverished individuals (H2)*.

DATA AND MEASUREMENT

The cross-national analysis draws on an online survey jointly conducted in nine European countries in June of 2015. The samples, recruited by YouGov using the methodologies available in each country, are quota balanced in order to match national population statistics in terms of sex, age, and education level. This cross-country study allows us to examine political engagement as a function of individuals’ sociodemographic characteristics and their populist attitudes, and the interaction between the two. The number of cases is too small to engage in a systematic cross-country analysis, but we explore differences across countries that may point to relevant patterns.

In what follows, we present the main groups of variables of interest. The different wordings and descriptives are reported in the supplementary appendix. All variables except age (in years) are coded to run from 0 to 1.

Political engagement. Our dependent variable is measured with a series of indicators of attitudinal political involvement and political participation in order to be able to identify

potential differences across them. We analyse *interest in politics* (not at all, little, some, and very much) and *internal political efficacy* (an index based on the agreement scales for three statements). Indicators of political participation include whether the respondent has *voted* in the last general election of her country and whether s/he has performed any of the following participatory acts in the past 12 months: *demonstrating, petition signing, and expressing one's political views online*.

Sociodemographics. The four sociodemographic traits that we consider are *age* (coded in years), *gender* (female), *education* (nine levels, following a standardized coding scheme from primary education to PhD), and *income* (deciles based on respondent's country distribution adjusted for size of household using the OECD modified equivalence score).

Populist attitudes. Following the growing agreement around the definition of populism, in recent years several indicators have been suggested to measure populist attitudes at the individual level (Elchardus & Spruyt 2014; Rooduijn 2014; Stanley 2011). We adopted the six-item measure proposed by Akkerman et al. (2014), itself developed as a result of previous efforts by Hawkins and colleagues (Hawkins & Riding 2010; Hawkins et al. 2012). The six statements, displayed in the appendix, are designed to tap the core ideas that make up the populist discourse, namely, people-centrism, anti-elitism, the antagonism between the people and the elite, and the primacy of popular sovereignty. Respondents' agreement with each of the statements was measured using a five-point Likert scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The internal consistency of the resulting composite scales (mean of scores) is good for the whole sample, with an internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) of 0.83, and across all countries in the survey, with alphas varying between 0.77 (Greece) and 0.87 (France).

Our empirical strategy comprises several steps. First, we estimate the effects of gender, age, education, and household income on each of the indicators of political engagement. This allows us to assess to what extent the relationship between these sociodemographic variables and levels of political engagement generates political inequality. Populist attitudes will be able to reduce sociodemographic biases in engagement only to the extent that they exist. Second, we add to the model the scale of populist attitudes, which allows us to examine hypothesis 1 (populist attitudes are positively related to political engagement). Third, to test for hypothesis 2 (populist attitudes reduce the effect of socioeconomic characteristics on political engagement), we introduce an interaction term between populist attitudes and, separately, each of the sociodemographic factors under consideration. OLS is used for the two attitudes (interest and internal efficacy). For the participation models with dichotomous dependent variables, we use logistic regression. The models are first run on the pooled data set, using country-level fixed effects and robust standard errors clustered by country. All models are then replicated on each of the country samples separately in order to explore national variations. The detailed results of the country estimations are contained in the supplemental appendix.

RESULTS

The extent to which populist attitudes are able to level inequalities in participation depends on the extent to which these inequalities exist in the first place. Table 1 shows

the effect of the four selected sociodemographics on our indicators of political involvement and participation modes. As established by many previous works on political engagement, sociodemographics are important predictors of attitudinal involvement and participation. The gaps are clear for interest in politics and perceptions of political efficacy but also significant for voter turnout and online participation. Gender gaps do not exist for demonstrating and signing petitions. Age has a positive effect on interest and efficacy, as well as on voter turnout. However, younger people are slightly more likely to demonstrate and to express their political views online, which should come as no surprise considering previous findings (Melo & Stockemer 2014) and higher levels of Internet use among younger citizens. Higher levels of education are related to higher levels of engagement and participation in all indicators. Income matters for interest, efficacy and voter turnout, but not for petition signing or demonstrating and surprisingly seems to reduce online participation. Bearing in mind that it is a sample of Internet users, some of the effects of income on participation cannot be discerned with our data and are expected to be larger in the population. Country differences in the magnitude of these effects can be seen in the supplemental appendix.

[Table 1 about here]

Table 2 shows the effects of populist attitudes when added to the model including sociodemographic factors. The coefficients for the socioeconomic characteristics remain largely unchanged, whereas populist attitudes have a positive effect on interest, efficacy, petition signing, and online participation. We find, however, no significant effect of populist attitudes on turnout or demonstrating. Because the interpretation of the logistic regression interaction terms may be difficult, the relationship between populist attitudes and each of the indicators of political engagement is graphically presented in Figure 1.

[Table 2 about here]

[Figure 1 about here]

There is some interesting variation across countries and modes in the effect of populist attitudes, as summarised in Table 3 (full country models can be found in the supplementary appendix). In some places, populist attitudes do not seem to matter (Sweden); in other countries, they have some unexpected negative effects on participation (voting in Germany and Poland, demonstrating in Poland and Switzerland). Yet in most instances, populist attitudes increase political engagement. Internal efficacy, petition signing, and online participation are the indicators more clearly related to populist attitudes with a significant positive coefficient in eight of the nine countries. In contrast, evidence of a positive relationship between populist attitudes and electoral participation is found only for France. The effect of populist attitudes on participation in demonstrations seems to be particularly contingent on the context, as it has a significant positive effect only in countries where there is a relatively high level of protest (France, Greece, Spain).

[Table 3 about here]

Overall, our analyses provide only partial support for our first hypothesis (populist attitudes are expected to increase political engagement): the positive effect of populist attitudes seems to be contingent on the type of engagement and participation we consider and on the context.

Turning to our second hypothesis, we present the results of the models, adding an interaction term between populist attitudes and each of our four sociodemographic indicators. Figures 2a to 2d plot the effect of each sociodemographic variable for citizens scoring low and high on populism. Because the scale of populist attitudes is negatively skewed, we set a low level of populism at .25 and a high level at 1. The complete models are shown in Table A2 in the supplementary appendix, both for the whole sample and for each country.

[Figure 2 about here]

Regarding gender, our hypothesis is mostly disconfirmed. As displayed in Figure 2a, populism does not moderate any of the differences between men and women for any of the participation modes. Women do not seem to be particularly sensitive to the motivations that populist attitudes may induce people to become engaged. However, populism seems to reduce the gender gap in regard to political interest. The difference between men and women is nearly halved among those displaying high levels of populism, as compared to those with lower values on the populist scale.

As shown in Figure 2b, the presence of populist attitudes seems to come together with a higher rate of engagement of young citizens for all six indicators. This means that, on the one hand, populist attitudes reduce the typical positive effects of age on political interest and internal efficacy. When populist attitudes are present, age does not affect these political attitudes as it usually does. On the other hand, populist attitudes appear to further increase the already higher levels of online and protest participation of young citizens. In this case, the presence of populist attitudes generates more political inequalities, as they increase the differences between younger and older citizens, making young citizens even more likely to demonstrate and participate online.

Concerning engagement gaps according to level of education (Figure 2c), our results suggest these are not fundamentally altered by levels of populist attitudes. Populism seems to have some slight balancing effect by increasing the participation of individuals with lower levels of education comparatively more in voter turnout elections, petitions, and demonstrations.

Finally, as displayed in Figure 2d, large compensatory effects of populist attitudes are found in relation to income. Populist attitudes increase levels of engagement of impoverished people in all our indicators except for turnout. The income gap is reduced significantly, and it appears that both petition and online participation are particularly attractive options for low-income individuals with high levels of populist attitudes.

The evidence presented thus far offers some support regarding our second hypothesis. Populist attitudes do not correct gender gaps (except for interest), and they have a limited effect on education-based gaps, but they seem to be strong motivators to participate for young and low-income citizens.

DISCUSSION

In this article, we have explored the relationship between populist attitudes and political engagement. Our purpose has been twofold: to examine the relationship between populist attitudes and political engagement and to assess to what extent populist attitudes can moderate socioeconomic bias in political engagement. Several contributions can be highlighted.

First, our evidence suggests that populist attitudes can be a motivation to be politically more engaged, as they are positively related to internal political efficacy, petition signing, and the on-line expression of political opinions in most countries analysed. In countries where demonstrating is relatively frequent (such as France, Spain, or Greece) populist attitudes are also positively associated with participation in demonstrations. While we cannot consider this cross-sectional evidence as proof of a causal relationship between populist attitudes and political engagement, there seems to be some evidence of populist attitudes being potential motivators to enhance political participation. Further research should explore the nature of this relationship and assess to what extent the direction of causality is to be drawn from populist attitudes to participation, or whether some modes of participation can also enhance populist attitudes.

In this respect, a second important finding of this article is that, while populist attitudes are not related to turnout (except in France), they seem to be closely associated to petition signing (presumably done mostly online in our sample of Internet users) and to expressive online participation. The stronger relationship between populist attitudes and these modes could be due to the fact that these individualized expressive online modes of participation are particularly appealing to respondents who score high in populist attitudes. The institutional repertoire of political participation may seem less attractive to people who hold intense populist attitudes.

However, the argument could be made that being active online makes people more likely to be exposed to populist discourses and hence to develop populist attitudes. Previous works have highlighted how social media activism reflects some rhetorical features of populism: typical populist claims and terms (the common man, unity, direct democracy) match typical social media concepts (the Internet user, interactivity, openness, directness or democracy 2.0) (Gerbaudo 2013). While the analysis of how populist organisations use the Internet is still developing, some works suggest that online platforms contribute to presenting their ideology and worldview, representing “the people”, constructing threats, or enhancing confirmation bias through selective exposure (Krämer 2017). If this is the case for populist parties more than for mainstream ones, then we could expect that online activism may, in turn, enhance populist attitudes. Alternative research designs should address this question in future works. Further research should also try to assess to what extent factors like identity, efficacy, and moral outrage play a role as relevant mediating factors in the relationship between populist attitudes and participation.

Third, we have found that the presence of populist attitudes has a considerable capacity to address several socioeconomic biases in participation and hence to reduce political inequality. However, the balancing or moderating power of populist attitudes depends

on the sociodemographic trait and on the particular mode analysed. Populist attitudes do not have a mechanical effect by equally motivating all disadvantaged groups to become engaged.

Populist attitudes do increase the levels of engagement for youth (while they do not for the old) in all our indicators. Young people with populist attitudes are particularly active in demonstrating, signing petitions, and participating online. Likewise, low-income people are mobilized by populist attitudes, while high-income people are not. Populist attitudes, therefore, narrow age- and income-based gaps in engagement.

However, populist attitudes make no difference in regard to gender gaps in political participation and a small difference for educational gaps, mildly closing some of them. This could make sense if we consider that neither gender nor education is a concept typically present in discourses associated with populism. Populism seems to resonate much more among youthful and economically deprived individuals more than other disadvantaged groups. Moreover, in the case of gender, previous research has shown that \ populist parties are less attractive to women than to men, and most important for our concerns, that attitudes and economic evaluations have less of an effect on women's engagement than on men's (Spierings & Zaslove 2015; Hartevelde et al. 2015). In that sense, populist attitudes do not seem to be the kind of motivation that can compensate for gender gaps in participation. As for education, despite recent claims of an increasing educational gap with likely political consequences in contemporary democracies (Bovens & Wille 2010), our results appear to suggest that populist attitudes do not exert a greater mobilising effect among less-educated citizens. As noted by Hakhverdian et al. (2012), neither group tends to identify with educational categories, nor do parties usually stand as representatives of their interests.

With caveats already expressed regarding the interpretation of these results in terms of causal relationships, it seems that while populist attitudes involve a critical view of some of the defining elements of existing liberal democracies, they also appear to have several positive consequences to the extent that they may heighten political engagement and participation, particularly for some disadvantaged groups.

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TABLES AND FIGURES

Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.091** (0.014)	-0.082** (0.012)	-0.315** (0.110)	0.074 (0.072)	-0.096 (0.086)	-0.308** (0.073)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.033** (0.007)	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.009* (0.004)
Education	0.205** (0.017)	0.178** (0.014)	0.624** (0.158)	0.901** (0.092)	0.648** (0.136)	0.861** (0.176)
Income	0.088** (0.019)	0.091** (0.014)	1.121** (0.178)	0.027 (0.156)	0.254 (0.214)	-0.371* (0.151)
Constant	0.491** (0.017)	0.488** (0.010)	0.544* (0.272)	-0.502* (0.210)	-3.012** (0.257)	-0.598** (0.188)
Observations	15447	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630

Standard errors in parentheses

+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.090** (0.014)	-0.081** (0.012)	-0.315** (0.111)	0.090 (0.074)	-0.089 (0.091)	-0.297** (0.073)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.033** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)
Education	0.207** (0.018)	0.183** (0.015)	0.623** (0.158)	0.971** (0.093)	0.666** (0.144)	0.926** (0.188)
Income	0.094** (0.021)	0.105** (0.015)	1.118** (0.173)	0.163 (0.181)	0.308 (0.222)	-0.249+ (0.132)
Populism	0.071* (0.027)	0.161** (0.022)	-0.030 (0.289)	1.588** (0.295)	0.679 (0.433)	1.555** (0.280)
Constant	0.446** (0.028)	0.385** (0.018)	0.562 (0.368)	-1.535** (0.384)	-3.446** (0.501)	-1.607** (0.276)
Observations	15447	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630

Standard errors in parentheses


+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01

Table 3. Summary of the impact of populist attitudes on political engagement by country

	FR	DE	GR	IT	PL	ES	SE	CH	UK
Interest	+	+	-	+	0	0	0	+	0
Efficacy	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+
Vote	+	-	0	0	-	0	0	0	0
Petition	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+
Demonstration	+	0	+	0	-	+	0	-	0
On-line	+	+	+	+	+	+	0	+	+

Note: The positive (+) /negative (-) coefficient shows the direction of the relationship if statistically significant at least at the 0.05 level. 0 stands for a ns relationship

Figure 1: Populism and political engagement



Graphs report the expected values for interest, efficacy, vote, petition, demonstration and online participation according to different levels of populist attitudes as calculated from the models reported in Table 2.

Figure 2. The conditioning effect of populist attitudes on the relationship between socio-demographic variables and political engagement.

Figure 2a. Gender




Figure 2b. Age




Figure 2c. Education





Figure 2d. Income



Graphs report the expected values for interest, efficacy, vote, petition, demonstration and online participation according to different levels of populist attitudes and socio-demographic variables as calculated from the models reported the supplementary Appendix.

Supplementary Appendix

Variable coding

Education

“What is the highest level of education that you have completed? If your qualification is not listed, please select the level that most closely resembles your highest classification.” Coded using a standardized 9-level standardised scheme running from primary education or less to doctoral degree or equivalent.

Household income

“What is your household's MONTHLY income, after tax and compulsory deductions, from all sources? If you don't know the exact figure, please give your best estimate.” Coded in deciles of the income distribution in the given country, and adjusted for the size of the household using the OECD-modified equivalence scale.

Populist attitudes

“To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?”

1. The politicians in [country] need to follow the will of the people
2. The people, and not politicians, should make our most important policy decisions

3. The political differences between the elite and the people are larger than the differences among the people
4. I would rather be represented by a citizen than by a specialized politician
5. Elected officials talk too much and take too little action
6. What people call “compromise” in politics is really just selling out on one’s principles

Each item is measured on a five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The composite index is the average score across all items.

Interest in politics

“How interested, if at all, would you say you are in politics? Not at all, not very interested, quite interested, very interested”

Internal political efficacy

“To what extent do you agree or disagree with each of the following statements?”

1. I consider myself well-qualified to participate in politics
2. I feel that I have a pretty good understanding of the important political issues facing our country
3. I think that I am at least as well-informed about politics and government as most people

Each item is measured on a five-point scale from strongly disagree to strongly agree. The composite index is the average score across all items.

Voter turnout

“Some people don't vote nowadays for one reason or another. Did you vote in the previous (year) national election?” 1 means voted and 0 did not vote.

Other indicators of political participation

All modes are dummy variables scoring 1 if the respondent answered “In the past 12 months” and 0 otherwise to the following question:

“There are different ways of trying to improve things or help prevent things from going wrong. When have you LAST done the following?”

1. Signed a petition/public letter/campaign appeal (online or offline)
2. Attended a demonstration, march or rally
3. Discussed or shared opinion on politics on a social network site e.g. Facebook or Twitter

Table A1. Summary statistics of the dependent and independent variables

Variable	Obs	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Interest in politics	18,019	0.591	0.288	0	1
Internal efficacy	18,368	0.575	0.225	0	1
Vote	17,592	0.820	0.384	0	1
Petition	18,368	0.328	0.470	0	1
Demonstration	18,368	0.109	0.311	0	1
On-line participation	18,368	0.256	0.436	0	1
Female	18,368	0.531	0.499	0	1
Age	18,368	44.458	14.892	18	95
Education	18,368	0.461	0.233	0	1
Income	15,630	0.265	0.195	0	1
Populism	18,368	0.690	0.178	0	1

Table A2.1 How populism moderates gender inequalities, whole sample

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.141** (0.015)	-0.072** (0.019)	-0.441 (0.292)	0.182 (0.276)	-0.200 (0.340)	-0.257 (0.384)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.033** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)
Education	0.207** (0.018)	0.183** (0.015)	0.622** (0.159)	0.971** (0.094)	0.665** (0.145)	0.926** (0.187)
Income	0.094** (0.022)	0.105** (0.015)	1.119** (0.174)	0.163 (0.182)	0.307 (0.222)	-0.249+ (0.132)
Populism	0.039 (0.029)	0.167** (0.024)	-0.121 (0.372)	1.648** (0.403)	0.611 (0.471)	1.578** (0.329)
Female*Populism	0.072* (0.023)	-0.013 (0.022)	0.180 (0.392)	-0.130 (0.389)	0.155 (0.429)	-0.055 (0.485)
Constant	0.468** (0.028)	0.381** (0.017)	0.625 (0.426)	-1.578** (0.468)	-3.397** (0.521)	-1.623** (0.362)
Observations	15447	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630

OLS coefficients, except for the vote model (logit coefficients), with their standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01

Table A2.2 How populism moderates age inequalities, whole sample

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.091** (0.014)	-0.082** (0.012)	-0.320** (0.110)	0.088 (0.074)	-0.095 (0.090)	-0.298** (0.073)
Age	0.004** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.051** (0.011)	0.004 (0.007)	0.016 (0.010)	-0.007 (0.008)
Education	0.206** (0.018)	0.181** (0.015)	0.612** (0.161)	0.968** (0.096)	0.653** (0.143)	0.924** (0.190)
Income	0.093** (0.021)	0.103** (0.014)	1.105** (0.173)	0.159 (0.181)	0.295 (0.223)	-0.252+ (0.131)
Populism	0.223** (0.043)	0.371** (0.048)	1.042 (0.732)	1.983** (0.608)	2.242** (0.753)	1.770** (0.291)
Age*Populism	-0.003* (0.001)	-0.005** (0.001)	-0.026 (0.017)	-0.009 (0.011)	-0.035** (0.011)	-0.005 (0.008)

Constant	0.343** (0.033)	0.244** (0.035)	-0.168 (0.495)	-1.808** (0.473)	-4.547** (0.760)	-1.757** (0.321)
Observations	15447	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630

OLS coefficients, except for the vote model (logit coefficients), with their standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01

Table A2.3 How populism moderates education inequalities, whole sample

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.090** (0.014)	-0.081** (0.012)	-0.313** (0.110)	0.092 (0.074)	-0.088 (0.090)	-0.296** (0.073)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.033** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.009* (0.004)	-0.011** (0.004)
Education	0.199* (0.060)	0.199** (0.045)	1.571** (0.570)	1.873** (0.373)	1.157+ (0.643)	1.545** (0.379)
Income	0.094** (0.021)	0.105** (0.015)	1.114** (0.173)	0.158 (0.181)	0.304 (0.222)	-0.253+ (0.133)
Populism	0.066 (0.054)	0.171** (0.027)	0.549 (0.485)	2.177** (0.364)	0.993* (0.428)	1.953** (0.319)
Education*Populism	0.012 (0.089)	-0.023 (0.060)	-1.374 (0.848)	-1.287* (0.519)	-0.690 (0.876)	-0.875+ (0.498)
Constant	0.449** (0.037)	0.378** (0.022)	0.161 (0.387)	-1.951** (0.410)	-3.671** (0.505)	-1.891** (0.253)
Observations	15447	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630

OLS coefficients, except for the vote model (logit coefficients), with their standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01

Table A2.4 How populism moderates income inequalities, whole sample

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.090** (0.014)	-0.081** (0.012)	-0.315** (0.110)	0.091 (0.074)	-0.088 (0.091)	-0.297** (0.074)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.033** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.009** (0.003)	-0.011** (0.004)
Education	0.206** (0.018)	0.182** (0.015)	0.625** (0.157)	0.957** (0.093)	0.654** (0.145)	0.910** (0.190)
Income	0.189* (0.071)	0.222** (0.062)	0.914* (0.361)	2.089** (0.410)	1.723* (0.782)	1.856** (0.548)
Populism	0.107* (0.038)	0.206** (0.025)	-0.097 (0.297)	2.327** (0.301)	1.198** (0.455)	2.331** (0.372)
Income*Populism	-0.137 (0.093)	-0.170+ (0.085)	0.296 (0.669)	-2.741** (0.508)	-1.993* (0.998)	-2.976** (0.830)
Constant	0.421** (0.036)	0.354** (0.022)	0.609 (0.388)	-2.053** (0.389)	-3.817** (0.552)	-2.154** (0.300)
Observations	15447	15630	15082	15630	15630	15630

OLS coefficients, except for the vote model (logit coefficients), with their standard errors in parentheses.
+ p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01

Replication of Tables 1, 2, and A2 by country

All tables display the results with standard errors in parentheses

Code for all the tables: + p<.1, * p<.05, ** p<.01

France

Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement, France

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.139** (0.014)	-0.115** (0.010)	-0.295* (0.131)	-0.503** (0.121)	-0.232+ (0.135)	-0.777** (0.132)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.059** (0.005)	0.008+ (0.004)	0.005 (0.005)	-0.009* (0.004)
Education	0.232** (0.036)	0.174** (0.025)	0.844* (0.342)	0.707* (0.291)	0.849** (0.325)	1.045** (0.308)
Income	0.107** (0.041)	0.090** (0.029)	0.978* (0.385)	-0.674* (0.341)	-0.645+ (0.383)	-0.373 (0.359)
Constant	0.338** (0.031)	0.395** (0.022)	-1.706** (0.278)	-1.710** (0.258)	-2.091** (0.289)	-1.197** (0.263)
Observations	1798	1837	1722	1828	1828	1828

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, France

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.136** (0.014)	-0.110** (0.010)	-0.275* (0.131)	-0.464** (0.123)	-0.206 (0.135)	-0.747** (0.133)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.001** (0.000)	0.057** (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.013** (0.004)
Education	0.232** (0.035)	0.173** (0.025)	0.818* (0.342)	0.714* (0.295)	0.851** (0.327)	1.043** (0.311)
Income	0.116** (0.041)	0.102** (0.028)	1.049** (0.387)	-0.564+ (0.342)	-0.578 (0.382)	-0.280 (0.359)
Populism	0.135** (0.039)	0.208** (0.026)	0.868* (0.341)	1.797** (0.346)	1.043** (0.375)	1.488** (0.359)
Constant	0.252** (0.039)	0.265** (0.027)	-2.241** (0.351)	-2.899** (0.355)	-2.773** (0.386)	-2.161** (0.359)
Observations	1798	1837	1722	1828	1828	1828

Table A2.1. How populism moderates gender inequalities, France

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.180** (0.057)	-0.035 (0.039)	-0.473 (0.490)	-0.755 (0.544)	-0.172 (0.571)	-0.667 (0.568)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.001** (0.000)	0.057** (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.013** (0.004)
Education	0.232** (0.035)	0.172** (0.025)	0.821* (0.342)	0.715* (0.295)	0.851** (0.327)	1.043** (0.311)
Income	0.116** (0.041)	0.102** (0.028)	1.048** (0.388)	-0.561 (0.342)	-0.578 (0.382)	-0.281 (0.359)
Populism	0.108* (0.052)	0.256** (0.036)	0.733 (0.470)	1.645** (0.441)	1.063* (0.497)	1.526** (0.443)
Female*Populism	0.060 (0.076)	-0.104* (0.052)	0.282 (0.674)	0.383 (0.697)	-0.046 (0.743)	-0.108 (0.738)
Constant	0.271** (0.046)	0.229** (0.032)	-2.147** (0.416)	-2.783** (0.411)	-2.788** (0.457)	-2.189** (0.409)

Observations	1798	1837	1722	1828	1828	1828
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Table A2.2. How populism moderates age inequalities, France

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.136** (0.014)	-0.111** (0.010)	-0.273* (0.131)	-0.466** (0.123)	-0.208 (0.135)	-0.747** (0.133)
Age	0.004* (0.002)	0.005** (0.001)	0.041* (0.017)	0.035* (0.018)	0.052** (0.019)	-0.016 (0.018)
Education	0.231** (0.035)	0.168** (0.025)	0.839* (0.343)	0.685* (0.296)	0.802* (0.329)	1.046** (0.311)
Income	0.116** (0.041)	0.103** (0.028)	1.057** (0.388)	-0.562 (0.342)	-0.574 (0.383)	-0.280 (0.359)
Populism	0.184 (0.122)	0.440** (0.083)	-0.040 (0.995)	3.761** (1.162)	4.224** (1.267)	1.288 (1.083)
Age*Populism	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.005** (0.002)	0.023 (0.023)	-0.041+ (0.023)	-0.067** (0.025)	0.005 (0.023)
Constant	0.218* (0.090)	0.104+ (0.061)	-1.622* (0.724)	-4.349** (0.901)	-5.090** (0.979)	-2.015* (0.825)
Observations	1798	1837	1722	1828	1828	1828

Table A2.3. How populism moderates education inequalities, France

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.136** (0.014)	-0.110** (0.010)	-0.279* (0.131)	-0.465** (0.123)	-0.207 (0.135)	-0.748** (0.133)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.001** (0.000)	0.056** (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.013** (0.004)
Education	0.395** (0.136)	0.132 (0.093)	2.672* (1.242)	2.213+ (1.229)	2.176+ (1.313)	1.765 (1.261)
Income	0.117** (0.041)	0.102** (0.028)	1.050** (0.387)	-0.562 (0.342)	-0.576 (0.383)	-0.278 (0.359)
Populism	0.233** (0.087)	0.183** (0.060)	2.001* (0.803)	2.701** (0.806)	1.865* (0.880)	1.940* (0.849)
Education*Populism	-0.226 (0.182)	0.057 (0.125)	-2.684 (1.720)	-1.992 (1.589)	-1.790 (1.719)	-0.971 (1.644)
Constant	0.183** (0.068)	0.282** (0.046)	-3.002** (0.603)	-3.571** (0.651)	-3.374** (0.702)	-2.493** (0.671)
Observations	1798	1837	1722	1828	1828	1828

Table A2.4. How populism moderates income inequalities, France

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.136** (0.014)	-0.110** (0.010)	-0.278* (0.131)	-0.465** (0.123)	-0.208 (0.135)	-0.747** (0.133)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.001** (0.000)	0.057** (0.005)	0.004 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.012** (0.004)
Education	0.232** (0.035)	0.173** (0.025)	0.838* (0.343)	0.700* (0.295)	0.830* (0.327)	1.057** (0.311)
Income	0.086 (0.159)	0.002 (0.108)	-0.840 (1.436)	1.182 (1.448)	1.987 (1.563)	-1.974 (1.487)
Populism	0.125+ (0.065)	0.173** (0.044)	0.274 (0.552)	2.376** (0.587)	1.895** (0.637)	0.932 (0.589)
Income*Populism	0.041 (0.208)	0.137 (0.142)	2.682 (1.974)	-2.267 (1.832)	-3.389+ (2.010)	2.212 (1.880)
Constant	0.259** (0.055)	0.289** (0.037)	-1.836** (0.458)	-3.332** (0.504)	-3.402** (0.547)	-1.751** (0.495)

Observations	1798	1837	1722	1828	1828	1828
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Germany

Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement, Germany

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.148** (0.013)	-0.102** (0.010)	-0.273* (0.116)	0.166 (0.109)	-0.425* (0.194)	-0.509** (0.134)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.013** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.023** (0.007)	-0.012** (0.005)
Education	0.163** (0.032)	0.143** (0.023)	0.406 (0.285)	0.903** (0.251)	0.699 (0.440)	0.714* (0.305)
Income	0.157** (0.034)	0.114** (0.024)	1.743** (0.303)	-0.572* (0.273)	0.001 (0.477)	-0.574+ (0.333)
Constant	0.476** (0.025)	0.433** (0.018)	-0.040 (0.219)	-0.981** (0.202)	-1.716** (0.348)	-0.976** (0.242)
Observations	1672	1703	1690	1723	1723	1723

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Germany

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.147** (0.013)	-0.100** (0.010)	-0.282* (0.117)	0.175 (0.109)	-0.424* (0.195)	-0.503** (0.134)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.015** (0.004)	-0.007+ (0.004)	-0.023** (0.007)	-0.014** (0.005)
Education	0.168** (0.032)	0.150** (0.023)	0.383 (0.285)	0.934** (0.252)	0.705 (0.441)	0.743* (0.305)
Income	0.167** (0.034)	0.130** (0.024)	1.673** (0.304)	-0.502+ (0.275)	0.013 (0.479)	-0.508 (0.334)
Populism	0.105** (0.037)	0.175** (0.026)	-0.816* (0.328)	0.757* (0.302)	0.132 (0.516)	0.723* (0.362)
Constant	0.410** (0.034)	0.325** (0.024)	0.457 (0.297)	-1.448** (0.276)	-1.795** (0.467)	-1.417** (0.329)
Observations	1672	1703	1690	1723	1723	1723

Table A2.1. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Germany

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.145** (0.050)	-0.065+ (0.036)	-0.792+ (0.451)	-0.415 (0.412)	-0.658 (0.735)	-1.694** (0.526)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.014** (0.004)	-0.007+ (0.004)	-0.023** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.005)
Education	0.168** (0.032)	0.151** (0.023)	0.377 (0.285)	0.925** (0.252)	0.701 (0.441)	0.720* (0.306)
Income	0.167** (0.034)	0.130** (0.024)	1.679** (0.304)	-0.494+ (0.275)	0.015 (0.479)	-0.495 (0.335)
Populism	0.106* (0.048)	0.197** (0.034)	-1.167** (0.447)	0.372 (0.396)	0.018 (0.621)	0.124 (0.438)
Female*Populism	-0.003 (0.073)	-0.052 (0.052)	0.756 (0.646)	0.881 (0.594)	0.357 (1.079)	1.758* (0.745)
Constant	0.410** (0.040)	0.310** (0.029)	0.705+ (0.367)	-1.178** (0.328)	-1.715** (0.525)	-0.986** (0.372)
Observations	1672	1703	1690	1723	1723	1723

Table A2.2. How populism moderates age inequalities, Germany

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.147** (0.013)	-0.100** (0.010)	-0.278* (0.117)	0.173 (0.109)	-0.423* (0.195)	-0.500** (0.134)
Age	0.003+ (0.002)	0.002* (0.001)	0.037* (0.015)	-0.019 (0.014)	-0.018 (0.025)	-0.001 (0.017)
Education	0.168** (0.032)	0.150** (0.023)	0.391 (0.286)	0.934** (0.252)	0.704 (0.441)	0.744* (0.305)
Income	0.166** (0.034)	0.131** (0.024)	1.654** (0.305)	-0.490+ (0.275)	0.008 (0.480)	-0.520 (0.335)
Populism	0.169 (0.119)	0.161+ (0.085)	0.646 (1.014)	-0.047 (0.957)	0.434 (1.610)	1.549 (1.144)
Age*Populism	-0.001 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	-0.034 (0.022)	0.018 (0.020)	-0.007 (0.037)	-0.019 (0.025)
Constant	0.370** (0.079)	0.334** (0.057)	-0.497 (0.693)	-0.930 (0.645)	-1.988+ (1.079)	-1.953* (0.780)
Observations	1672	1703	1690	1723	1723	1723

Table A2.3. How populism moderates education inequalities, Germany

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.147** (0.013)	-0.100** (0.010)	-0.276* (0.117)	0.171 (0.109)	-0.414* (0.195)	-0.503** (0.134)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.014** (0.004)	-0.007+ (0.004)	-0.024** (0.007)	-0.014** (0.005)
Education	0.244* (0.112)	0.232** (0.080)	2.708* (1.114)	0.148 (0.913)	2.442+ (1.474)	0.577 (1.087)
Income	0.166** (0.034)	0.130** (0.024)	1.664** (0.305)	-0.497+ (0.275)	0.002 (0.479)	-0.507 (0.335)
Populism	0.162+ (0.088)	0.236** (0.063)	0.777 (0.795)	0.164 (0.725)	1.513 (1.243)	0.597 (0.867)
Education*Populism	-0.115 (0.162)	-0.122 (0.115)	-3.370* (1.543)	1.165 (1.299)	-2.658 (2.173)	0.245 (1.539)
Constant	0.373** (0.063)	0.286** (0.045)	-0.629 (0.577)	-1.053* (0.518)	-2.689** (0.872)	-1.333* (0.622)
Observations	1672	1703	1690	1723	1723	1723

Table A2.4. How populism moderates income inequalities, Germany

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.147** (0.013)	-0.100** (0.010)	-0.286* (0.117)	0.176 (0.109)	-0.425* (0.195)	-0.499** (0.135)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.015** (0.004)	-0.007+ (0.004)	-0.023** (0.007)	-0.015** (0.005)
Education	0.169** (0.032)	0.151** (0.023)	0.401 (0.286)	0.927** (0.252)	0.711 (0.441)	0.720* (0.306)
Income	0.053 (0.120)	0.065 (0.086)	-0.292 (1.116)	0.358 (0.989)	-0.796 (1.663)	1.912 (1.178)
Populism	0.051 (0.066)	0.144** (0.047)	-1.626** (0.556)	1.150* (0.531)	-0.259 (0.926)	1.831** (0.636)
Income*Populism	0.170 (0.172)	0.098 (0.123)	2.922+ (1.606)	-1.277 (1.414)	1.220 (2.399)	-3.589* (1.681)
Constant	0.445** (0.049)	0.345** (0.035)	0.986* (0.418)	-1.703** (0.397)	-1.546* (0.674)	-2.140** (0.478)
Observations	1672	1703	1690	1723	1723	1723

Greece

Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement, Greece

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.021 (0.014)	-0.044** (0.008)	-0.546** (0.142)	0.223* (0.105)	0.067 (0.119)	-0.097 (0.095)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.000)	0.015** (0.005)	0.021** (0.004)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.015** (0.004)
Education	0.139** (0.034)	0.146** (0.021)	0.717* (0.357)	1.268** (0.248)	0.647* (0.283)	0.035 (0.231)
Income	0.006 (0.048)	0.014 (0.029)	1.208* (0.528)	0.804* (0.351)	1.013* (0.395)	-0.028 (0.328)
Constant	0.413** (0.028)	0.443** (0.017)	1.003** (0.277)	-2.582** (0.225)	-1.753** (0.240)	-0.866** (0.195)
Observations	1865	1874	1853	1860	1860	1860

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Greece

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.024+ (0.014)	-0.040** (0.008)	-0.552** (0.143)	0.374** (0.110)	0.147 (0.121)	-0.061 (0.096)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.000)	0.015** (0.005)	0.018** (0.004)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.014** (0.004)
Education	0.142** (0.034)	0.142** (0.020)	0.727* (0.358)	1.269** (0.258)	0.618* (0.287)	-0.001 (0.233)
Income	-0.004 (0.048)	0.030 (0.029)	1.183* (0.531)	1.239** (0.363)	1.267** (0.399)	0.097 (0.331)
Populism	-0.088* (0.044)	0.149** (0.026)	-0.186 (0.436)	3.539** (0.370)	2.143** (0.397)	1.130** (0.302)
Constant	0.475** (0.041)	0.340** (0.025)	1.132** (0.411)	-5.267** (0.379)	-3.303** (0.385)	-1.659** (0.290)
Observations	1865	1874	1853	1860	1860	1860

Table A2.1. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Greece

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	0.022 (0.065)	0.068+ (0.039)	-2.164** (0.678)	2.894** (0.584)	-1.177+ (0.611)	2.177** (0.463)
Age	0.003** (0.001)	0.002** (0.000)	0.016** (0.005)	0.018** (0.004)	-0.005 (0.005)	0.013** (0.004)
Education	0.143** (0.034)	0.144** (0.020)	0.692+ (0.357)	1.328** (0.259)	0.597* (0.288)	0.052 (0.234)
Income	-0.005 (0.048)	0.027 (0.029)	1.235* (0.534)	1.249** (0.367)	1.281** (0.399)	0.053 (0.334)
Populism	-0.060 (0.058)	0.211** (0.034)	-1.402* (0.673)	5.158** (0.543)	1.377** (0.517)	2.477** (0.418)
Female*Populism	-0.063 (0.087)	-0.147** (0.052)	2.177* (0.887)	-3.289** (0.744)	1.745* (0.790)	-3.051** (0.617)
Constant	0.454** (0.050)	0.294** (0.030)	2.046** (0.577)	-6.574** (0.503)	-2.715** (0.456)	-2.681** (0.368)
Observations	1865	1874	1853	1860	1860	1860

Table A2.2. How populism moderates age inequalities, Greece

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.028*	-0.043**	-0.563**	0.378**	0.135	-0.069
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.144)	(0.110)	(0.121)	(0.096)
Age	0.013**	0.008**	0.032	-0.000	0.034	0.034*
	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.016)
Education	0.143**	0.142**	0.732*	1.271**	0.617*	0.001
	(0.033)	(0.020)	(0.358)	(0.259)	(0.288)	(0.233)
Income	-0.006	0.028	1.182*	1.240**	1.268**	0.094
	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.530)	(0.364)	(0.400)	(0.331)
Populism	0.543**	0.544**	0.755	2.404+	4.568**	2.387*
	(0.146)	(0.085)	(1.357)	(1.325)	(1.400)	(1.044)
Age*Populism	-0.014**	-0.009**	-0.023	0.024	-0.054+	-0.028
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.022)
Constant	0.027	0.061	0.466	-4.420**	-5.102**	-2.557**
	(0.107)	(0.062)	(0.995)	(1.018)	(1.076)	(0.773)
Observations	1865	1874	1853	1860	1860	1860

Table A2.3 How populism moderates education inequalities, Greece

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.024+	-0.040**	-0.550**	0.375**	0.145	-0.059
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.143)	(0.110)	(0.121)	(0.096)
Age	0.003**	0.002**	0.015**	0.018**	-0.006	0.014**
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Education	0.056	0.147+	2.101	1.712	-0.524	0.717
	(0.142)	(0.085)	(1.561)	(1.201)	(1.312)	(0.991)
Income	-0.003	0.030	1.173*	1.230**	1.285**	0.086
	(0.048)	(0.029)	(0.530)	(0.364)	(0.400)	(0.331)
Populism	-0.134	0.152**	0.488	3.785**	1.521+	1.515*
	(0.086)	(0.051)	(0.856)	(0.750)	(0.796)	(0.599)
Education*Populism	0.118	-0.008	-1.901	-0.586	1.511	-0.985
	(0.190)	(0.114)	(2.091)	(1.553)	(1.692)	(1.321)
Constant	0.508**	0.338**	0.642	-5.454**	-2.832**	-1.941**
	(0.068)	(0.041)	(0.674)	(0.626)	(0.647)	(0.478)
Observations	1865	1874	1853	1860	1860	1860

Table A2.4. How populism moderates income inequalities, Greece

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.025+	-0.040**	-0.546**	0.373**	0.147	-0.063
	(0.014)	(0.008)	(0.143)	(0.110)	(0.121)	(0.096)
Age	0.003**	0.002**	0.015**	0.018**	-0.006	0.013**
	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.004)
Education	0.137**	0.138**	0.755*	1.277**	0.608*	-0.027
	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.358)	(0.259)	(0.287)	(0.233)
Income	0.532*	0.419**	-3.007	0.521	2.424	2.934*
	(0.208)	(0.125)	(2.305)	(1.730)	(1.812)	(1.454)
Populism	0.027	0.230**	-0.919	3.374**	2.414**	1.743**
	(0.061)	(0.036)	(0.594)	(0.536)	(0.576)	(0.433)
Income*Populism	-0.731**	-0.530**	5.793+	0.951	-1.529	-3.855*
	(0.277)	(0.165)	(3.138)	(2.237)	(2.336)	(1.923)
Constant	0.392**	0.282**	1.663**	-5.141**	-3.508**	-2.104**
	(0.052)	(0.031)	(0.508)	(0.479)	(0.499)	(0.369)
Observations	1865	1874	1853	1860	1860	1860

Italy

Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement, Italy

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.066** (0.014)	-0.053** (0.011)	0.064 (0.148)	0.172+ (0.102)	-0.135 (0.155)	-0.278** (0.105)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.023** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	-0.017** (0.005)	-0.010** (0.004)
Education	0.218** (0.038)	0.183** (0.029)	0.704+ (0.423)	1.129** (0.276)	0.655 (0.403)	1.101** (0.283)
Income	0.032 (0.045)	0.090** (0.035)	0.566 (0.503)	-0.262 (0.330)	-0.040 (0.501)	-0.823* (0.347)
Constant	0.471** (0.032)	0.445** (0.025)	0.508 (0.327)	-0.949** (0.235)	-1.466** (0.341)	-0.393+ (0.239)
Observations	1741	1774	1736	1770	1770	1770

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Italy

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.067** (0.014)	-0.056** (0.011)	0.056 (0.148)	0.149 (0.103)	-0.141 (0.155)	-0.319** (0.107)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.023** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.017** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.004)
Education	0.222** (0.038)	0.191** (0.029)	0.729+ (0.423)	1.257** (0.281)	0.675+ (0.404)	1.253** (0.289)
Income	0.038 (0.045)	0.102** (0.034)	0.593 (0.504)	-0.151 (0.334)	-0.018 (0.502)	-0.715* (0.353)
Populism	0.082* (0.039)	0.181** (0.029)	0.560 (0.395)	1.969** (0.302)	0.398 (0.432)	2.365** (0.319)
Constant	0.410** (0.043)	0.313** (0.032)	0.110 (0.429)	-2.426** (0.334)	-1.756** (0.466)	-2.150** (0.344)
Observations	1741	1774	1736	1770	1770	1770

Table A2.1. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Italy

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.186** (0.059)	-0.057 (0.045)	-1.036+ (0.600)	-0.647 (0.472)	-0.643 (0.671)	-0.187 (0.502)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.022** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.017** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.004)
Education	0.222** (0.038)	0.191** (0.029)	0.728+ (0.425)	1.250** (0.281)	0.669+ (0.404)	1.255** (0.289)
Income	0.038 (0.045)	0.102** (0.034)	0.596 (0.506)	-0.156 (0.334)	-0.020 (0.501)	-0.715* (0.353)
Populism	0.008 (0.053)	0.180** (0.040)	-0.181 (0.566)	1.466** (0.414)	0.090 (0.584)	2.444** (0.434)
Female*Populism	0.158* (0.077)	0.001 (0.058)	1.482+ (0.789)	1.036+ (0.600)	0.664 (0.862)	-0.169 (0.632)
Constant	0.467** (0.051)	0.313** (0.039)	0.674 (0.535)	-2.029** (0.400)	-1.517** (0.555)	-2.212** (0.417)
Observations	1741	1774	1736	1770	1770	1770

Table A2.2. How populism moderates age inequalities, Italy

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.067** (0.014)	-0.055** (0.011)	0.066 (0.149)	0.150 (0.103)	-0.135 (0.155)	-0.320** (0.107)
Age	0.005* (0.002)	0.005** (0.001)	0.108** (0.020)	0.004 (0.015)	0.016 (0.022)	-0.023 (0.016)
Education	0.222** (0.038)	0.191** (0.029)	0.678 (0.426)	1.257** (0.281)	0.682+ (0.404)	1.253** (0.289)
Income	0.033 (0.045)	0.097** (0.034)	0.454 (0.508)	-0.160 (0.335)	-0.076 (0.504)	-0.700* (0.353)
Populism	0.325** (0.121)	0.373** (0.092)	5.465** (1.154)	2.379* (0.964)	2.342+ (1.339)	1.731+ (0.986)
Age*Populism	-0.005* (0.002)	-0.004* (0.002)	-0.117** (0.026)	-0.009 (0.020)	-0.045 (0.029)	0.014 (0.021)
Constant	0.233* (0.094)	0.173* (0.071)	-3.378** (0.873)	-2.734** (0.764)	-3.192** (1.058)	-1.671* (0.782)
Observations	1741	1774	1736	1770	1770	1770

Table A2.3. How populism moderates education inequalities, Italy

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.068** (0.014)	-0.056** (0.011)	0.051 (0.148)	0.151 (0.103)	-0.142 (0.155)	-0.317** (0.107)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.023** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.017** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.004)
Education	0.646** (0.152)	0.274* (0.117)	4.360* (1.719)	4.164** (1.183)	-0.469 (1.684)	3.150* (1.235)
Income	0.033 (0.045)	0.101** (0.034)	0.562 (0.506)	-0.198 (0.335)	0.002 (0.503)	-0.747* (0.353)
Populism	0.276** (0.078)	0.219** (0.059)	2.168** (0.819)	3.346** (0.628)	-0.159 (0.899)	3.266** (0.658)
Education*Populism	-0.575** (0.200)	-0.112 (0.153)	-4.960* (2.240)	-3.868* (1.525)	1.536 (2.189)	-2.506 (1.585)
Constant	0.267** (0.066)	0.285** (0.050)	-1.066 (0.678)	-3.467** (0.536)	-1.341+ (0.749)	-2.836** (0.559)
Observations	1741	1774	1736	1770	1770	1770

Table A2.4. How populism moderates income inequalities, Italy

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.067** (0.014)	-0.056** (0.011)	0.055 (0.148)	0.149 (0.103)	-0.139 (0.155)	-0.319** (0.107)
Age	0.001 (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.022** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	-0.017** (0.005)	-0.012** (0.004)
Education	0.219** (0.038)	0.188** (0.029)	0.724+ (0.424)	1.239** (0.281)	0.705+ (0.405)	1.252** (0.290)
Income	0.259 (0.175)	0.339* (0.133)	1.016 (1.876)	0.971 (1.403)	-1.869 (2.090)	-0.675 (1.551)
Populism	0.141* (0.059)	0.243** (0.045)	0.665 (0.594)	2.253** (0.462)	-0.066 (0.657)	2.375** (0.480)
Income*Populism	-0.298 (0.228)	-0.321+ (0.174)	-0.582 (2.479)	-1.482 (1.803)	2.473 (2.689)	-0.052 (1.967)
Constant	0.370** (0.053)	0.270** (0.040)	0.040 (0.521)	-2.626** (0.416)	-1.439* (0.573)	-2.157** (0.427)
Observations	1741	1774	1736	1770	1770	1770

Poland

Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement, Poland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.079** (0.013)	-0.020* (0.009)	-0.492** (0.128)	-0.206+ (0.115)	-0.382* (0.193)	-0.178 (0.111)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.054** (0.005)	-0.018** (0.004)	-0.032** (0.007)	-0.011** (0.004)
Education	0.117** (0.032)	0.083** (0.022)	1.583** (0.337)	0.759** (0.276)	-1.198* (0.506)	0.358 (0.272)
Income	0.051 (0.035)	0.049* (0.025)	0.556 (0.357)	0.170 (0.316)	0.643 (0.521)	0.345 (0.306)
Constant	0.489** (0.028)	0.447** (0.020)	-1.589** (0.271)	-0.688** (0.245)	-0.692+ (0.389)	-0.733** (0.240)
Observations	1746	1763	1667	1744	1744	1744

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Poland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.079** (0.013)	-0.021* (0.009)	-0.498** (0.129)	-0.210+ (0.115)	-0.375+ (0.194)	-0.182 (0.111)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.055** (0.005)	-0.019** (0.004)	-0.031** (0.007)	-0.012** (0.004)
Education	0.118** (0.032)	0.087** (0.022)	1.578** (0.338)	0.779** (0.277)	-1.217* (0.506)	0.384 (0.273)
Income	0.053 (0.035)	0.054* (0.024)	0.544 (0.359)	0.196 (0.317)	0.610 (0.521)	0.377 (0.307)
Populism	0.067+ (0.035)	0.231** (0.024)	-0.976** (0.361)	0.727* (0.327)	-1.111* (0.482)	0.949** (0.319)
Constant	0.442** (0.037)	0.288** (0.025)	-0.915* (0.368)	-1.194** (0.336)	0.049 (0.499)	-1.395** (0.330)
Observations	1746	1763	1667	1744	1744	1744

Table A2.1. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Poland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.123* (0.053)	-0.005 (0.036)	-0.903+ (0.546)	-0.239 (0.494)	-0.229 (0.705)	-0.376 (0.485)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.055** (0.005)	-0.019** (0.004)	-0.031** (0.007)	-0.012** (0.004)
Education	0.118** (0.032)	0.088** (0.022)	1.569** (0.339)	0.779** (0.277)	-1.213* (0.507)	0.381 (0.273)
Income	0.052 (0.035)	0.055* (0.024)	0.535 (0.359)	0.195 (0.317)	0.614 (0.522)	0.370 (0.307)
Populism	0.039 (0.048)	0.241** (0.033)	-1.267* (0.528)	0.710 (0.435)	-1.030+ (0.615)	0.834* (0.425)
Female*Populism	0.061 (0.070)	-0.021 (0.048)	0.552 (0.723)	0.039 (0.655)	-0.212 (0.989)	0.262 (0.641)
Constant	0.463** (0.044)	0.281** (0.030)	-0.698 (0.469)	-1.181** (0.399)	-0.007 (0.564)	-1.308** (0.391)
Observations	1746	1763	1667	1744	1744	1744

Table A2.2. How populism moderates age inequalities, Poland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.079** (0.013)	-0.021* (0.009)	-0.506** (0.129)	-0.213+ (0.115)	-0.370+ (0.194)	-0.190+ (0.111)
Age	0.004* (0.002)	0.004** (0.001)	0.083** (0.021)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.044+ (0.026)	0.024 (0.016)
Education	0.118** (0.032)	0.087** (0.022)	1.584** (0.339)	0.779** (0.277)	-1.221* (0.507)	0.386 (0.273)
Income	0.054 (0.035)	0.056* (0.024)	0.551 (0.359)	0.201 (0.317)	0.612 (0.521)	0.398 (0.308)
Populism	0.114 (0.111)	0.370** (0.076)	0.456 (1.094)	1.446 (0.998)	-1.812 (1.467)	3.096** (0.997)
Age*Populism	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.003+ (0.002)	-0.038 (0.027)	-0.017 (0.023)	0.018 (0.036)	-0.050* (0.022)
Constant	0.408** (0.084)	0.189** (0.058)	-1.975* (0.850)	-1.719* (0.768)	0.534 (1.078)	-2.972** (0.773)
Observations	1746	1763	1667	1744	1744	1744

Table A2.3. How populism moderates education inequalities, Poland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.078** (0.013)	-0.021* (0.009)	-0.500** (0.129)	-0.208+ (0.115)	-0.385* (0.194)	-0.187+ (0.111)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.055** (0.005)	-0.019** (0.004)	-0.031** (0.007)	-0.012** (0.004)
Education	0.161 (0.131)	0.049 (0.089)	1.209 (1.446)	1.150 (1.147)	-3.184 (1.965)	-0.364 (1.166)
Income	0.053 (0.035)	0.055* (0.024)	0.550 (0.359)	0.190 (0.317)	0.646 (0.523)	0.390 (0.308)
Populism	0.093 (0.086)	0.207** (0.059)	-1.193 (0.902)	0.964 (0.786)	-2.288+ (1.210)	0.485 (0.770)
Education*Populism	-0.060 (0.179)	0.055 (0.123)	0.511 (1.948)	-0.518 (1.557)	2.889 (2.749)	1.039 (1.573)
Constant	0.424** (0.067)	0.305** (0.046)	-0.758 (0.703)	-1.364* (0.614)	0.847 (0.904)	-1.060+ (0.603)
Observations	1746	1763	1667	1744	1744	1744

Table A2.4. How populism moderates income inequalities, Poland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.078** (0.013)	-0.019* (0.009)	-0.495** (0.129)	-0.214+ (0.115)	-0.376+ (0.194)	-0.169 (0.111)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.055** (0.005)	-0.019** (0.004)	-0.031** (0.007)	-0.012** (0.004)
Education	0.116** (0.032)	0.084** (0.022)	1.568** (0.339)	0.788** (0.278)	-1.211* (0.507)	0.351 (0.274)
Income	0.179 (0.134)	0.263** (0.092)	1.171 (1.466)	-0.339 (1.237)	0.274 (1.721)	2.526* (1.206)
Populism	0.120+ (0.066)	0.320** (0.045)	-0.733 (0.655)	0.497 (0.607)	-1.264 (0.889)	1.894** (0.612)
Income*Populism	-0.175 (0.180)	-0.291* (0.124)	-0.854 (1.933)	0.740 (1.652)	0.500 (2.444)	-2.960+ (1.607)
Constant	0.404** (0.054)	0.225** (0.037)	-1.091* (0.541)	-1.027* (0.499)	0.151 (0.704)	-2.087** (0.509)
Observations	1746	1763	1667	1744	1744	1744

Spain

Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement, Spain

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.057** (0.013)	-0.082** (0.010)	-0.080 (0.132)	0.135 (0.100)	0.209 (0.133)	-0.149 (0.111)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.031** (0.005)	-0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.009* (0.004)
Education	0.242** (0.024)	0.211** (0.018)	0.587* (0.252)	0.722** (0.181)	0.835** (0.235)	1.277** (0.200)
Income	0.087* (0.036)	0.077** (0.028)	0.847* (0.388)	0.500+ (0.271)	0.238 (0.354)	-0.909** (0.310)
Constant	0.412** (0.027)	0.438** (0.021)	-0.081 (0.260)	-0.933** (0.209)	-2.332** (0.284)	-0.893** (0.228)
Observations	1797	1819	1780	1808	1808	1808

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Spain

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.057** (0.013)	-0.081** (0.010)	-0.080 (0.132)	0.158 (0.102)	0.228+ (0.134)	-0.142 (0.112)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.030** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.010* (0.004)
Education	0.242** (0.024)	0.213** (0.018)	0.589* (0.252)	0.816** (0.185)	0.907** (0.237)	1.338** (0.202)
Income	0.087* (0.036)	0.086** (0.028)	0.855* (0.389)	0.741** (0.279)	0.426 (0.360)	-0.776* (0.314)
Populism	-0.005 (0.038)	0.099** (0.029)	0.088 (0.379)	2.482** (0.312)	2.024** (0.412)	1.659** (0.336)
Constant	0.416** (0.039)	0.366** (0.030)	-0.143 (0.375)	-2.798** (0.323)	-3.888** (0.439)	-2.122** (0.344)
Observations	1797	1819	1780	1808	1808	1808

Table A2.1. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Spain

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.152** (0.056)	-0.053 (0.043)	0.251 (0.557)	-0.100 (0.464)	1.929** (0.640)	0.157 (0.505)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.030** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.010* (0.004)
Education	0.242** (0.024)	0.213** (0.018)	0.587* (0.252)	0.815** (0.185)	0.923** (0.238)	1.340** (0.202)
Income	0.084* (0.036)	0.087** (0.028)	0.863* (0.390)	0.736** (0.279)	0.464 (0.360)	-0.771* (0.314)
Populism	-0.066 (0.051)	0.117** (0.039)	0.314 (0.528)	2.316** (0.426)	3.217** (0.618)	1.848** (0.461)
Female*Populism	0.133+ (0.076)	-0.039 (0.058)	-0.461 (0.755)	0.351 (0.616)	-2.260** (0.828)	-0.406 (0.669)
Constant	0.458** (0.046)	0.354** (0.035)	-0.301 (0.453)	-2.677** (0.386)	-4.806** (0.575)	-2.260** (0.415)
Observations	1797	1819	1780	1808	1808	1808

Table A2.2. How populism moderates age inequalities, Spain

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.059** (0.013)	-0.082** (0.010)	-0.085 (0.133)	0.146 (0.102)	0.223+ (0.134)	-0.150 (0.112)
Age	0.007** (0.002)	0.003* (0.002)	0.045* (0.021)	0.055** (0.017)	0.027 (0.023)	0.020 (0.019)
Education	0.240** (0.024)	0.212** (0.018)	0.583* (0.252)	0.806** (0.186)	0.901** (0.237)	1.330** (0.203)
Income	0.082* (0.036)	0.084** (0.028)	0.842* (0.390)	0.714* (0.280)	0.413 (0.360)	-0.800* (0.315)
Populism	0.343** (0.125)	0.246* (0.096)	0.922 (1.184)	5.991** (1.076)	3.477* (1.407)	3.393** (1.118)
Age*Populism	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.003 (0.002)	-0.021 (0.028)	-0.079** (0.023)	-0.033 (0.030)	-0.040 (0.025)
Constant	0.171+ (0.092)	0.263** (0.070)	-0.729 (0.871)	-5.340** (0.820)	-4.964** (1.095)	-3.375** (0.848)
Observations	1797	1819	1780	1808	1808	1808

Table A2.3. How populism moderates education inequalities, Spain

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.057** (0.013)	-0.082** (0.010)	-0.080 (0.132)	0.160 (0.102)	0.226+ (0.134)	-0.139 (0.112)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.030** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.010* (0.004)
Education	0.074 (0.093)	0.114 (0.071)	0.524 (0.984)	1.558* (0.769)	0.168 (1.025)	2.479** (0.838)
Income	0.089* (0.036)	0.088** (0.028)	0.855* (0.390)	0.727** (0.279)	0.440 (0.360)	-0.800* (0.315)
Populism	-0.101 (0.064)	0.044 (0.048)	0.054 (0.626)	2.919** (0.543)	1.574* (0.729)	2.368** (0.612)
Education*Populism	0.238+ (0.127)	0.139 (0.098)	0.091 (1.344)	-1.025 (1.029)	0.990 (1.337)	-1.558 (1.109)
Constant	0.483** (0.053)	0.405** (0.040)	-0.120 (0.512)	-3.116** (0.458)	-3.553** (0.624)	-2.641** (0.511)
Observations	1797	1819	1780	1808	1808	1808

Table A2.4. How populism moderates income inequalities, Spain

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.057** (0.013)	-0.081** (0.010)	-0.079 (0.132)	0.165 (0.102)	0.229+ (0.134)	-0.138 (0.112)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.030** (0.005)	-0.003 (0.004)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.010* (0.004)
Education	0.242** (0.024)	0.213** (0.018)	0.586* (0.252)	0.807** (0.185)	0.904** (0.237)	1.332** (0.203)
Income	0.341** (0.129)	-0.007 (0.099)	1.881 (1.461)	3.918** (1.047)	0.947 (1.452)	2.317* (1.132)
Populism	0.087 (0.059)	0.065 (0.045)	0.395 (0.562)	3.662** (0.498)	2.213** (0.658)	2.732** (0.519)
Income*Populism	-0.367* (0.179)	0.135 (0.137)	-1.471 (2.006)	-4.476** (1.424)	-0.716 (1.933)	-4.359** (1.549)
Constant	0.351** (0.050)	0.389** (0.038)	-0.357 (0.472)	-3.658** (0.434)	-4.027** (0.581)	-2.894** (0.451)
Observations	1797	1819	1780	1808	1808	1808

Sweden

Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement, Sweden

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.135** (0.013)	-0.137** (0.011)	0.101 (0.218)	0.292** (0.108)	-0.239 (0.193)	-0.535** (0.115)
Age	0.001+ (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.019** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.016** (0.004)
Education	0.241** (0.029)	0.239** (0.024)	0.928+ (0.497)	0.601* (0.236)	0.802+ (0.419)	0.406 (0.252)
Income	0.076* (0.033)	0.135** (0.028)	0.831 (0.537)	-0.176 (0.269)	0.638 (0.474)	-0.060 (0.280)
Constant	0.478** (0.025)	0.375** (0.021)	1.282** (0.390)	-1.154** (0.204)	-2.939** (0.360)	-0.299 (0.208)
Observations	1683	1702	1689	1700	1700	1700

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Sweden

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.134** (0.013)	-0.136** (0.011)	0.124 (0.219)	0.308** (0.109)	-0.263 (0.193)	-0.521** (0.116)
Age	0.001+ (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.019** (0.007)	-0.002 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.016** (0.004)
Education	0.246** (0.029)	0.243** (0.025)	1.050* (0.502)	0.674** (0.241)	0.686 (0.423)	0.475+ (0.256)
Income	0.079* (0.033)	0.138** (0.028)	0.900+ (0.538)	-0.132 (0.270)	0.574 (0.475)	-0.024 (0.282)
Populism	0.041 (0.039)	0.039 (0.033)	1.007 (0.639)	0.573+ (0.320)	-0.942+ (0.556)	0.537 (0.332)
Constant	0.447** (0.039)	0.346** (0.033)	0.560 (0.597)	-1.584** (0.316)	-2.248** (0.538)	-0.697* (0.323)
Observations	1683	1702	1689	1700	1700	1700

Table A2.1. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Sweden

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.075 (0.051)	-0.085+ (0.044)	0.506 (0.834)	-0.239 (0.419)	-0.437 (0.717)	-0.727 (0.451)
Age	0.001* (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.019** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.016** (0.004)
Education	0.245** (0.029)	0.243** (0.025)	1.044* (0.502)	0.681** (0.241)	0.688 (0.423)	0.477+ (0.256)
Income	0.077* (0.033)	0.136** (0.028)	0.892+ (0.538)	-0.111 (0.271)	0.581 (0.476)	-0.017 (0.282)
Populism	0.080 (0.051)	0.072+ (0.043)	1.244 (0.811)	0.194 (0.425)	-1.043 (0.687)	0.423 (0.410)
Female*Populism	-0.093 (0.078)	-0.080 (0.066)	-0.611 (1.285)	0.850 (0.629)	0.285 (1.136)	0.320 (0.676)
Constant	0.423** (0.044)	0.325** (0.037)	0.411 (0.671)	-1.341** (0.362)	-2.188** (0.588)	-0.624+ (0.357)
Observations	1683	1702	1689	1700	1700	1700

Table A2.2. How populism moderates age inequalities, Sweden

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.134** (0.013)	-0.136** (0.011)	0.127 (0.219)	0.309** (0.109)	-0.261 (0.193)	-0.521** (0.116)
Age	0.004* (0.002)	0.004** (0.001)	0.043 (0.027)	0.007 (0.013)	0.017 (0.022)	-0.009 (0.014)
Education	0.243** (0.029)	0.241** (0.025)	1.026* (0.505)	0.666** (0.241)	0.673 (0.423)	0.468+ (0.256)
Income	0.078* (0.033)	0.136** (0.028)	0.878 (0.538)	-0.138 (0.271)	0.571 (0.475)	-0.027 (0.282)
Populism	0.261* (0.124)	0.207* (0.104)	2.719 (1.877)	1.240 (1.000)	0.686 (1.739)	0.966 (1.015)
Age*Populism	-0.005+ (0.002)	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.040 (0.041)	-0.014 (0.020)	-0.035 (0.035)	-0.010 (0.021)
Constant	0.310** (0.083)	0.241** (0.070)	-0.483 (1.221)	-2.004** (0.677)	-3.236** (1.147)	-0.968 (0.687)
Observations	1683	1702	1689	1700	1700	1700

Table A2.3. How populism moderates education inequalities, Sweden

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.134** (0.013)	-0.136** (0.011)	0.124 (0.219)	0.309** (0.109)	-0.263 (0.193)	-0.523** (0.116)
Age	0.001+ (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.019** (0.007)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.016** (0.004)
Education	0.313** (0.103)	0.345** (0.087)	-0.682 (1.654)	3.081** (0.865)	2.133 (1.399)	2.053* (0.906)
Income	0.080* (0.033)	0.138** (0.028)	0.889+ (0.540)	-0.116 (0.272)	0.590 (0.476)	-0.008 (0.282)
Populism	0.092 (0.083)	0.115 (0.071)	-0.173 (1.257)	2.417** (0.713)	0.294 (1.263)	1.730* (0.737)
Education*Populism	-0.107 (0.156)	-0.161 (0.132)	2.786 (2.534)	-3.745** (1.285)	-2.385 (2.186)	-2.446+ (1.342)
Constant	0.415** (0.061)	0.298** (0.051)	1.291 (0.906)	-2.772** (0.523)	-3.004** (0.888)	-1.466** (0.535)
Observations	1683	1702	1689	1700	1700	1700

Table A2.4. How populism moderates income inequalities, Sweden

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.134** (0.013)	-0.137** (0.011)	0.116 (0.219)	0.298** (0.109)	-0.277 (0.193)	-0.536** (0.116)
Age	0.001+ (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.018* (0.007)	-0.003 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.006)	-0.016** (0.004)
Education	0.246** (0.029)	0.244** (0.025)	1.053* (0.505)	0.684** (0.241)	0.701+ (0.423)	0.495+ (0.256)
Income	0.185 (0.119)	0.286** (0.101)	3.449+ (1.872)	2.282* (0.984)	3.224* (1.633)	3.036** (1.031)
Populism	0.103 (0.077)	0.125+ (0.065)	2.314* (1.115)	1.965** (0.636)	0.786 (1.154)	2.307** (0.667)
Income*Populism	-0.164 (0.178)	-0.233 (0.151)	-4.114 (2.883)	-3.740* (1.465)	-4.296+ (2.519)	-4.715** (1.527)
Constant	0.408** (0.058)	0.291** (0.048)	-0.234 (0.803)	-2.477** (0.478)	-3.323** (0.844)	-1.840** (0.498)
Observations	1683	1702	1689	1700	1700	1700

Switzerland

Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement, Switzerland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.063** (0.013)	-0.093** (0.011)	-0.820** (0.120)	0.021 (0.108)	0.432+ (0.229)	0.085 (0.126)
Age	0.003** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.051** (0.004)	0.005 (0.003)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.004)
Education	0.253** (0.030)	0.148** (0.025)	-0.029 (0.289)	0.791** (0.244)	0.502 (0.511)	1.872** (0.287)
Income	0.210** (0.038)	0.194** (0.032)	1.852** (0.378)	0.012 (0.307)	1.176+ (0.615)	-0.814* (0.367)
Constant	0.315** (0.027)	0.341** (0.023)	-2.008** (0.259)	-1.280** (0.223)	-3.412** (0.472)	-1.879** (0.261)
Observations	1652	1660	1377	1623	1623	1623

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, Switzerland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.064** (0.013)	-0.094** (0.011)	-0.814** (0.121)	0.017 (0.108)	0.434+ (0.227)	0.069 (0.131)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.052** (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.015** (0.004)
Education	0.255** (0.030)	0.149** (0.025)	-0.044 (0.290)	0.813** (0.247)	0.457 (0.506)	2.061** (0.302)
Income	0.231** (0.038)	0.222** (0.032)	1.806** (0.380)	0.157 (0.310)	1.028 (0.625)	-0.449 (0.374)
Populism	0.190** (0.039)	0.240** (0.033)	-0.359 (0.362)	1.260** (0.324)	-1.631* (0.652)	3.632** (0.412)
Constant	0.203** (0.035)	0.201** (0.030)	-1.792** (0.338)	-2.034** (0.298)	-2.460** (0.595)	-4.119** (0.379)
Observations	1652	1660	1377	1623	1623	1623

Table A2.1. How populism moderates gender inequalities, Switzerland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.173** (0.052)	-0.139** (0.043)	-0.092 (0.477)	1.315** (0.438)	0.028 (0.814)	-0.577 (0.571)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.052** (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.001 (0.007)	-0.015** (0.004)
Education	0.255** (0.030)	0.150** (0.025)	-0.017 (0.290)	0.817** (0.248)	0.457 (0.505)	2.059** (0.302)
Income	0.237** (0.038)	0.224** (0.032)	1.752** (0.382)	0.094 (0.311)	1.056+ (0.629)	-0.415 (0.375)
Populism	0.111* (0.053)	0.207** (0.044)	0.196 (0.507)	2.204** (0.455)	-1.984* (0.939)	3.188** (0.557)
Female*Populism	0.165* (0.076)	0.069 (0.063)	-1.096 (0.702)	-1.943** (0.636)	0.666 (1.283)	0.918 (0.790)
Constant	0.253** (0.042)	0.221** (0.035)	-2.147** (0.408)	-2.641** (0.366)	-2.260** (0.704)	-3.822** (0.452)
Observations	1652	1660	1377	1623	1623	1623

Table A2.2. How populism moderates age inequalities, Switzerland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.064** (0.013)	-0.096** (0.011)	-0.820** (0.121)	0.015 (0.108)	0.409+ (0.228)	0.073 (0.131)
Age	0.003 (0.002)	0.008** (0.001)	0.070** (0.017)	0.006 (0.014)	0.038 (0.026)	-0.023 (0.019)
Education	0.256** (0.030)	0.154** (0.025)	-0.049 (0.291)	0.816** (0.247)	0.460 (0.507)	2.053** (0.303)
Income	0.230** (0.038)	0.208** (0.032)	1.768** (0.382)	0.149 (0.312)	0.936 (0.635)	-0.429 (0.376)
Populism	0.227+ (0.122)	0.610** (0.102)	0.917 (1.168)	1.467 (1.025)	1.363 (2.049)	3.068* (1.255)
Age*Populism	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.008** (0.002)	-0.028 (0.025)	-0.004 (0.021)	-0.065 (0.042)	0.012 (0.026)
Constant	0.180* (0.082)	-0.033 (0.068)	-2.596** (0.780)	-2.167** (0.692)	-4.220** (1.305)	-3.733** (0.892)
Observations	1652	1660	1377	1623	1623	1623

Table A2.3. How populism moderates education inequalities, Switzerland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.063** (0.013)	-0.094** (0.011)	-0.814** (0.121)	0.017 (0.108)	0.434+ (0.227)	0.071 (0.131)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.052** (0.004)	0.003 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.015** (0.004)
Education	0.051 (0.111)	0.176+ (0.093)	-0.052 (1.081)	0.568 (0.943)	4.040* (1.754)	0.994 (1.291)
Income	0.229** (0.038)	0.222** (0.032)	1.806** (0.381)	0.154 (0.310)	1.119+ (0.633)	-0.458 (0.375)
Populism	0.029 (0.093)	0.261** (0.077)	-0.366 (0.893)	1.067 (0.786)	1.628 (1.670)	2.811** (1.046)
Education*Populism	0.317+ (0.166)	-0.042 (0.139)	0.013 (1.654)	0.374 (1.389)	-6.011* (2.820)	1.533 (1.806)
Constant	0.308** (0.066)	0.187** (0.054)	-1.788** (0.620)	-1.906** (0.561)	-4.431** (1.132)	-3.537** (0.777)
Observations	1652	1660	1377	1623	1623	1623

Table A2.4. How populism moderates income inequalities, Switzerland

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.067** (0.013)	-0.095** (0.011)	-0.809** (0.121)	-0.010 (0.109)	0.413+ (0.227)	0.040 (0.132)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.003** (0.000)	0.052** (0.004)	0.002 (0.003)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.016** (0.004)
Education	0.254** (0.030)	0.149** (0.025)	-0.046 (0.290)	0.807** (0.247)	0.447 (0.506)	2.065** (0.303)
Income	0.707** (0.152)	0.367** (0.128)	0.950 (1.477)	4.276** (1.269)	4.118+ (2.244)	3.819* (1.597)
Populism	0.341** (0.061)	0.286** (0.051)	-0.621 (0.567)	2.596** (0.520)	-0.452 (1.056)	4.947** (0.647)
Income*Populism	-0.712** (0.220)	-0.218 (0.185)	1.300 (2.171)	-6.099** (1.825)	-4.959 (3.486)	-6.049** (2.217)
Constant	0.107* (0.046)	0.171** (0.039)	-1.624** (0.438)	-2.901** (0.401)	-3.155** (0.778)	-5.015** (0.512)
Observations	1652	1660	1377	1623	1623	1623

United Kingdom

Table 1. Inequalities in political engagement, UK

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.109** (0.014)	-0.095** (0.010)	0.181 (0.193)	0.303** (0.105)	-0.500* (0.255)	-0.337** (0.116)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.015* (0.006)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.023** (0.008)	-0.021** (0.004)
Education	0.197** (0.031)	0.196** (0.024)	1.260** (0.461)	0.853** (0.237)	1.437* (0.568)	0.895** (0.263)
Income	0.023 (0.036)	0.052+ (0.027)	0.733 (0.515)	0.370 (0.273)	-1.194+ (0.668)	-0.335 (0.303)
Constant	0.541** (0.029)	0.519** (0.022)	0.902* (0.391)	-0.455* (0.222)	-2.141** (0.501)	-0.031 (0.241)
Observations	1520	1533	1568	1574	1574	1574

Table 2. The effect of populist attitudes on political engagement, UK

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.109** (0.014)	-0.095** (0.010)	0.179 (0.193)	0.309** (0.106)	-0.507* (0.255)	-0.345** (0.117)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.015* (0.006)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.024** (0.008)	-0.022** (0.004)
Education	0.202** (0.031)	0.206** (0.024)	1.335** (0.465)	1.004** (0.242)	1.563** (0.574)	1.091** (0.269)
Income	0.029 (0.036)	0.063* (0.027)	0.814 (0.519)	0.529+ (0.277)	-1.087 (0.669)	-0.162 (0.307)
Populism	0.059 (0.040)	0.105** (0.031)	0.834 (0.562)	1.510** (0.315)	1.302+ (0.728)	1.905** (0.350)
Constant	0.498** (0.041)	0.444** (0.031)	0.322 (0.549)	-1.549** (0.321)	-3.057** (0.728)	-1.391** (0.350)
Observations	1520	1533	1568	1574	1574	1574

Table A2.1. How populism moderates gender inequalities, UK

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.124* (0.054)	-0.084* (0.041)	2.458** (0.765)	-0.145 (0.419)	0.318 (1.048)	-0.439 (0.481)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.014* (0.006)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.025** (0.008)	-0.022** (0.004)
Education	0.202** (0.031)	0.206** (0.024)	1.337** (0.464)	1.003** (0.242)	1.563** (0.575)	1.091** (0.269)
Income	0.029 (0.036)	0.063* (0.027)	0.861+ (0.523)	0.526+ (0.277)	-1.075 (0.669)	-0.163 (0.307)
Populism	0.049 (0.053)	0.113** (0.041)	2.264** (0.727)	1.204** (0.415)	1.731+ (0.906)	1.846** (0.452)
Female*Populism	0.023 (0.079)	-0.018 (0.061)	-3.518** (1.130)	0.696 (0.621)	-1.218 (1.510)	0.141 (0.696)
Constant	0.504** (0.046)	0.439** (0.035)	-0.535 (0.604)	-1.359** (0.362)	-3.334** (0.813)	-1.354** (0.394)
Observations	1520	1533	1568	1574	1574	1574

Table A2.2 How populism moderates age inequalities, UK

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.109** (0.014)	-0.097** (0.010)	0.162 (0.194)	0.308** (0.106)	-0.559* (0.256)	-0.342** (0.118)
Age	0.002 (0.002)	0.004** (0.001)	0.041+ (0.024)	-0.003 (0.014)	0.054 (0.033)	-0.026 (0.016)
Education	0.202** (0.031)	0.205** (0.024)	1.324** (0.466)	1.003** (0.242)	1.522** (0.574)	1.092** (0.269)
Income	0.029 (0.036)	0.058* (0.027)	0.753 (0.522)	0.526+ (0.278)	-1.216+ (0.672)	-0.156 (0.308)
Populism	0.079 (0.132)	0.280** (0.100)	2.764 (1.761)	1.658 (1.025)	6.334** (2.220)	1.673 (1.107)
Age*Populism	-0.000 (0.003)	-0.004+ (0.002)	-0.042 (0.036)	-0.003 (0.020)	-0.118* (0.049)	0.005 (0.023)
Constant	0.485** (0.089)	0.334** (0.068)	-0.862 (1.153)	-1.643* (0.693)	-6.311** (1.567)	-1.242 (0.760)
Observations	1520	1533	1568	1574	1574	1574

Table A2.3. How populism moderates education inequalities, UK

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.109** (0.014)	-0.095** (0.010)	0.183 (0.193)	0.309** (0.106)	-0.505* (0.255)	-0.339** (0.118)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.014* (0.006)	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.024** (0.008)	-0.023** (0.004)
Education	0.138 (0.116)	0.235** (0.088)	2.312 (1.698)	0.879 (0.906)	1.986 (2.192)	2.305* (1.029)
Income	0.029 (0.036)	0.063* (0.027)	0.822 (0.519)	0.528+ (0.278)	-1.083 (0.669)	-0.147 (0.307)
Populism	0.013 (0.090)	0.126+ (0.069)	1.468 (1.198)	1.419* (0.709)	1.642 (1.848)	2.811** (0.822)
Education*Populism	0.098 (0.172)	-0.045 (0.131)	-1.537 (2.561)	0.193 (1.351)	-0.626 (3.127)	-1.826 (1.491)
Constant	0.528** (0.067)	0.430** (0.051)	-0.085 (0.870)	-1.489** (0.529)	-3.288* (1.369)	-2.003** (0.614)
Observations	1520	1533	1568	1574	1574	1574

Table A2.4. How populism moderates income inequalities, UK

	Interest	Efficacy	Vote	Petition	Demons.	On-line
Female	-0.109** (0.014)	-0.095** (0.010)	0.183 (0.193)	0.312** (0.106)	-0.509* (0.255)	-0.342** (0.118)
Age	0.002** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.014* (0.006)	-0.006 (0.003)	-0.024** (0.008)	-0.023** (0.004)
Education	0.202** (0.031)	0.206** (0.024)	1.333** (0.464)	1.006** (0.242)	1.561** (0.574)	1.093** (0.269)
Income	-0.059 (0.132)	0.244* (0.101)	1.624 (1.872)	1.255 (1.036)	-1.848 (2.564)	0.803 (1.178)
Populism	0.019 (0.070)	0.187** (0.053)	1.157 (0.910)	1.839** (0.554)	0.991 (1.243)	2.336** (0.620)
Income*Populism	0.136 (0.195)	-0.279+ (0.149)	-1.276 (2.826)	-1.112 (1.529)	1.122 (3.649)	-1.440 (1.698)
Constant	0.524** (0.056)	0.391** (0.042)	0.122 (0.702)	-1.764** (0.438)	-2.850** (0.987)	-1.678** (0.489)
Observations	1520	1533	1568	1574	1574	1574

